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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Alan A. Creel appeals from his conviction for possession of marijuana in excess 
of three ounces after entering a conditional plea in which he preserved his right to 
appeal the district court's decision denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On July 15, 2009, Ada County Deputy Sheriff Kevin Louwsma was on patrol and 
conducted a traffic stop of Creel's Chevrolet S-10 truck after he ran the truck's license 
plate number on his mobile data terminal ("MDT") and discovered that, although the 
truck was black, the vehicle registration indicated the truck was red. (7/30/10 Tr., p.15, 
L.15 - p.17, L.6.) The deputy spoke to the driver, Creel, who explained that he had 
recently "Rhino-lined his truck [black], that it used to be red, and that he just had not 
changed it with the Department of Motor Vehicles." (7/30/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.7-17.) While 
talking to Creel, the deputy noticed "signs and symptoms of marijuana usage and also 
could smell the strong odor of what [his] training and experience has taught [him] to be 
marijuana." (7/30/10 Tr., p.18, L.22 - p.19, L.1.) A subsequent search of Creel's truck 
by officers resulted in the seizure of over three ounces of marijuana, and Creel's arrest 
for possession of marijuana. (7/30/10 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-25.) 
Creel was charged with possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, a 
felony. (R., pp.23-24.) Creel filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his 
truck, asserting Deputy Louwsma did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic 
stop of his truck based merely on the discrepancy between the color of the truck and the 
vehicle registration's listed color. (R., pp.30-35.) The district court initially denied 
1 
Creel's suppression motion based on Creel's failure to establish a nexus between the 
traffic stop and the discovery of marijuana in his truck. 1 (R., pp.68-71.) After that ruling 
was made, "[t]he parties requested a further evidentiary hearing in the matter, which 
was held on July 30, 2010." (R., p.78.) After that hearing, during which both Creel and 
Deputy Louwsma testified, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
ruling that Deputy Louwsma conducted a valid traffic stop of Creel's truck because he 
had reasonable suspicion the truck may have been stolen and that it displayed fictitious 
license plates. (R., pp.78-82.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Creel entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony 
possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, preserving his right to appeal the 
district court's order denying his suppression motion. (R., pp.93-101; 2/11/11 Tr., p.29, 
L.4 - p.44, L.2.) The district court sentenced Creel to a unified term of five years with 
one year fixed, and suspended that sentence and placed Creel on probation for five 
years. (R., pp.104-109.) Creel filed a timely appeal. (R., pp.113-116.) 
1 The district court subsequently explained that its initial ruling was based on a record 
in which the parties "relied solely on a few stipulated facts and did not present 
witnesses." (R., p.78.) 
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ISSUE 
Creel states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Creel's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Creel failed to show the district court erred in holding that Deputy Louwsma had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Creel's vehicle based upon the 
discrepancy between the truck color and the color listed on the vehicle registration? 
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ARGUMENT 
Creel Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Holding That Deputy Louwsma 
Had Reasonable Suspicion To Conduct A Traffic Stop Of Creel's Vehicle Based Upon 
The Discrepancy Between The Truck Color And The Color Listed On The Vehicle 
Registration 
A. Introduction 
Creel contends the district court erred by ruling that Deputy Louwsma had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of his truck solely because the color of the 
truck (black) did not match the color listed on the truck's vehicle registration (red). 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-7.) Contrary to Creel's claim, the district court correctly 
determined that the disparity between the color listed in his vehicle registration and the 
color of his truck provided Deputy Louwsma with reasonable suspicion to believe Creel 
might have changed the license plate of his truck with another, or that the truck may 
have been stolen. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the 
appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 
206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 
133, 135 (2005)). The appellate court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the trial court's application of 
constitutional principles and determinations of reasonable suspicion, in light of the facts 
found. Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183 (citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 
302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)); State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121,127,233 P.3d 52, 58 
(2010). 
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C. Deputy Louwsma Had Reasonable Suspicion To Conduct A Traffic Stop Of 
Creel's Truck 
It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 
894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). Such an investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of a stop. 
State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423, 901 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1995). Because a routine 
vehicle traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an 
investigative detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 
Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
The "reasonable suspicion" standard requires an officer to articulate specific facts 
which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that 
the person is or has been involved in criminal activity. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 
821 P.2d at 951-952; State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 430, 925 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Ct. 
App. 1996). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951. Whether the officer had the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the 
circumstances. State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 
2004). Although a series of facts may appear innocent when viewed separately, they 
may warrant further investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 
913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001). The presence of reasonable suspicion is 
an objective test that does not depend on the individual officer's subjective thought 
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processes. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (Ct App. 2009) 
(citing Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435,436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998)); see also Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996). 
On appeal, Creel argues: 
... that simply a [sic] having a different color on a vehicle other than the 
color listed on the registration, without any more indication of how a crime 
may have been committed or how criminal activity may be afoot, is not 
enough information to give a law enforcement officer reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to stop that vehicle. . .. 
. . . [H]ere, it is quite unlikely that a person would switch license plates 
from the same model to another. The plates had not been reported 
stolen,121 and there was nothing about Mr. Creel's driving that indicated 
that he was violating the law. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Creel has not provided any authority supporting his assertion 
that the discrepancy between the color of his truck and the color listed in his vehicle 
registration does not provide Deputy Louwsma with reasonable suspicion justifying his 
stop of Creel's truck. (See id., pp.6-7.) Despite Creel's speculative contention that "it is 
quite unlikely that a person would switch license plates from the same model to another" 
(id.), whether criminal activity is "quite unlikely" is not the standard to be applied. 
Rather, an investigatory stop is permissible under Terry if a law enforcement officer 
"entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway." Gallegos, 120 
Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951. Deputy Louwsma had reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity for two reasons, and articulated them well. He testified during the suppression 
hearing that he had over four and one-half years experience as a deputy sheriff, and 
2 Although the state does not contend that the license plates had been reported stolen, 
it is unable to discern any testimony establishing they were not reported stolen. 
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explained his suspicions after he realized the color of Creel's truck was different than 
the color listed on the truck's vehicle's registration: 
The thing that jumps into my mind is usually one of two things. One 
is fictitious display of license plates, do those license plates belong to that 
car. The other thing is, is it possibly a stolen vehicle with just a license 
plate from a Chevrolet S-10, but it could not - maybe not be to that 
vehicle. 
What I was trying to get was his registration so that I could check 
the VIN, make sure that the VIN matched the VIN on the registration and 
that the vehicle wasn't stolen, they were the correct license plates to 
vehicle is why I was chatting with himPl 
{7/30/10 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-5; p.17, Ls.10-16; p.19, Ls.6-11.) The district court summarized 
Deputy Louwsma's testimony in its memorandum decision, stating, "due to the color 
discrepancy [Deputy Louwsma] thought the vehicle could have fictitious license plates in 
violation of I.C. § 49-456(3) or that the vehicle could have been stolen and plates from 
another Chevrolet S-10 pickup could have been put on." (R., p.80.) Deputy Louwsma's 
testimony "articulate[d] specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from 
those facts, justify the suspicion" that Creel's vehicle may have either been stolen or 
displaying fictitious license plates - both being criminal activities. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 
at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 951-952; Martinez, 129 Idaho at 430, 925 P.2d at 1129. 
Although, there was a possible innocent explanation for the discrepancy between the 
color of Creel's truck and the color listed on the vehicle registration, the deputy was 
entitled to conduct a traffic stop of Creel's truck to attempt to clarify his suspicions. 
3 Deputy Louwsma testified that the only way to get the VIN number from a vehicle is to 
stop that vehicle. (7 /30/10 Tr., p.19, Ls.12-15.) 
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In Aders v. Florida, 67 So.3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011 ), the Florida Fourth District 
Court of Appeals considered the precise issue presented in Creel's case, and reached 
the same conclusion as the district court. The Florida appellate court explained: 
In arguing that the traffic stop was invalid, Aders contends there 
could be no reasonable suspicion he violated state law if Deputy 
Pickering's sole reason was that the car's color did not match the color 
listed in state records, especially, he asserts, where there is no legal 
requirement that a driver notify the state of color changes. While the 
statutory and regulatory framework bears out the truth of Aders' assertion, 
we nonetheless agree with those courts from other states holding that a 
color discrepancy between a car and its computer registration creates 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop for further 
investigation . 
. . . The state has not and could not cite to a regulation or statute 
that Aders violated by failing to notify the department that he had painted 
his blue car black. 
But, Deputy Pickering suspected Aders of improperly transferring a 
license plate, which is a second-degree misdemeanor under section 
320.261, Florida Statutes (2010). A color discrepancy is enough to create 
a reasonable suspicion in the mind of a law enforcement officer of the 
violation of this criminal law. For example, in Smith v. State, a trooper 
"initiated [a] traffic stop because a computer check on the vehicle's license 
plate revealed that the plate was registered to a yellow Oldsmobile rather 
than a blue and white one." 713 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 
After the stop, the trooper discovered that the car belonged to the 
passenger, "who had painted it a different color, which explained the 
apparently mismatched license plate." Id. The Indiana court held that the 
investigator.ii' stop of the vehicle "was valid and supported by reasonable 
suspicion."[ 1 Id. at 342. Similarly, in Andrews v. State, the court found 
reasonable suspicion to exist where an officer observed a greenish-gold 
4 The Smith decision explained: 
Here, the evidence was uncontroverted that the license plate on Smith's 
blue and white car was registered to a yellow car. Upon conducting a 
computer check, Sergeant Henson had reasonable suspicion to believe 
that Smith's vehicle had a mismatched plate, and as such, could be stolen 
or retagged. Sergeant Henson's traffic stop was valid and comported with 
the mandates of the Fourth Amendment. 
713 N.E.2d at 342. 
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car that a computer check revealed to be registered as silver in color; the 
court concluded that it was reasonable for the officer "to infer that the 
license plate may have been switched from another car."151 289 Ga. App. 
679, 658 S.E.2d 126, 127-28 (2008). Applying Smith and Andrews to this 
case, we affirm the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress. 
Aders, 67 So.3d at 371-372 (original footnotes omitted). 
As the Aders, Smith, and Andrews decisions demonstrate, several courts have 
concluded that it is reasonable for an officer to suspect criminal activity when confronted 
solely with a discrepancy between the color of a vehicle and the color listed on that 
vehicle's registration. In Creel's case, the district court likewise reasonably concluded 
the state had "established an objectively 'reasonable and articulable suspicion' by 
Deputy Louwsma that either the pickup or its occupants were or were about to be 
'engaged in criminal activity' thereby justifying the stop of Defendant's pickup." (R., 
p.81.) Inasmuch as the testimony of Deputy Louwsma established that he had a 
reasonable suspicion under Terry to conduct a traffic stop of Creel's truck, the district 
court's decision denying Creel's motion to suppress was correct, and must be affirmed. 
5 In Andrews, the Georgia Court of Appeals further stated: 
According to the appellants, Jones' belief that the car was a different color 
than that listed on the registration was a mere "hunch" that did not give 
rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. As a 
threshold matter, we note that it is unlawful to transfer a license plate 
assigned to one vehicle to another vehicle and/or to knowingly operate a 
vehicle with such improperly transferred tag. Thus, if Jones had reason to 
believe that the tag had been improperly transferred, he would have had a 
legitimate basis for stopping the car. 
658 S.E.2d at 127 (footnote omitted).) 
9 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Creel's motion to suppress evidence recovered from Creel's vehicle and affirm 
Creel's conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of April, 2012, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JCM/pm 
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. McKinney 
Attorney General 
